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to
this
provision contained in the

Judgment. He fails to demonstrate that the Trial Court

acted within its discretion in enforcing

penalty provision contained within the Stipulated

Judgment. He also fails to demonstrate that the finding that Doug did not interfere with Vicki's
ability to pay off the remainder of the Lapham debt was supported by the evidence admitted at
trial.
IV. ARGUMENT
Doug's Assertion that the Standard of Review Requires that this Court Affirm the
Trial Court is Meritless.

Doug erroneously asserts
Court to simply affirm the
and presented viable issues at trial

applicable standard of review in this matter requires this
rulings. This is simply untrue.
them in

should be denied because Vicki "simply ask[ s]
findings of fact that: 1) enforcement

appeal. Doug

appeal

Court to second guess the Trial Court's

the judgment is not an inequitable forfeiture; and, 2) that

Douglas did not prevent [Vicki] from performing [her] obligations under the Judgment." First, it
should be noted that many of the
law or mixed questions of law

fact,

raised by

parties in this appeal involve questions of

Vicki is not merely inviting the

abused

to second

m

enforcing the damage
was not

not

not
is not
District Court.
asserts that Vicki did not argue at trial that

Stipulated Judgment is

unenforceable as a matter of law as it contains a forfeiture provision. On the contrary, this issue
was raised during the evidentiary hearing (Tr. VoL £I, p. 325,

15-25; p. 326,

1-16), in the

post trial briefing of both parties (R. Vol. II, p. 357; p. 363-364; p. 380-382; p. 412-416; R. Vol.
p. 446-450; p. 462-464), in both parties' briefing on the motion for reconsideration, (R. VoL
III, p. 498-50 I; p. 533-540) and in both of the

memorandum decisions (R. Vol. III, p.

569-570). Clearly, this issue was raised at trial.

B.

Doug's Lack of Transcripts Argument is Not Supported by Authority, and is
Contrary to Existing Law.
Doug argues that the record does not support Vicki's appeal, on the basis that

not

transcripts from the hearing on Vicki's Motion for Reconsideration.

did

a result, he

this Court cannot determine what evidence was presented and must assume it would
support the District Court's conclusions. First, it should be noted that no evidence was submitted
at that hearing. The minutes from that hearing (R. Vol. III, p. 554-556) reveal that only oral
argument was presented to the Court. Argument,

Doug's apparent belief to the contrary,

is not evidence.
The issues raised at that hearing were
with the Trial

briefed by both parties, and those briefs,
are made

written

473-474; p. 569-570).
IS

or

or

must
the

~~~~~~=~~=~=, 144 Idaho 171,

transcript of the

failed to

1

v. Liddle & Moeller Const.,

to

In

claims on appeal because

158 P.3d 947, 948 (2007). This Court refused to consider

it was unable to determine what ev1ae11ce was presented to the Trial

949.

Id. at 1

This matter is distinguishable from Fritts because a clear record exists as to what
evidence was or was not presented at trial. The relevant evidentiary transcripts were by
this appeal. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1-95; Tr. Vol. II, p. 1-44;

submitted and even relied on by Doug
Vol. III, p. 1-488).

Doug

not submit

decisions are insufficient to

a

transcript of that hearing as necessary to

appeal.

and

HH.,HHJ<

if Doug viewed

he had ample opportunity to

Rules of Appellate Procedure, and failed to

transcripts
manner.

authority showing that

that right

a

19, 29(a). Therefore, Doug's argument must be
to

support her claim of error and, therefore, in accordance with Liberty Banker's Life Ins. Co. v.

Witherspoon,
the parties

Davenport

, this appeal

not be considered.
was

on appeal about

Liberty,

for

comply with Idaho
~=~=.:, I

1039 (2016).
forfeiture at

in Liberty, neither party
at 69 , 1

a

case,

rulings as

clause constitutes an inequitable

unenforceable penalty, and the Trial Court

to make findings to support any ruling on
received by Doug was reasonably

the damages he suffered from the alleged breach.

Liberty, therefore, has no precedential value to the issue before this Court
Moreover, Vicki has in fact presented a record that discloses adverse rulings. (R. Vol.
III, p. 466-476; 564-570). The

ruled that Vicki's equitable defenses do not apply and that

Doug did not interfere with Vicki's ability to perform. Additionally, these rulings were reduced
to a final judgment by Doug. (R Vol. III,
Vicki submitted an

572-574). Thus, Doug

record and this case

Accordingly, this Court must consider the issues raised

C.

failed to demonstrate

in stark contrast to

Vicki on appeal.

The Rules of Equity Apply Equally to a Stipulated Judgment as to a Contract;
Therefore, Doug's Argument that this Court Cannot Consider Equity with Regard
to a Stipulated Judgment is Without Merit.
In order to justify the Trial Court's failure to apply

at issue in this case, Doug claims on appeal the Trial Court merely enforced

unambiguous

terms of a Judgment, rather than applied a forfeiture provision in a contract In support of this
argument, Doug

to Hull v.

While

from

he

misstates the scope of the holding. Although this Court in that case reversed an order enforcing a
penalty clause as an

because it was

no

into the parties' agreement
progeny only to

as
court could not impose
Instead, upon any
need to return to court for that court to ""'''""r,""
occurred, whether that
Even if the district court could add forfeiture terms to the contract,
the terms the court added impermissibly punish Giesler for not
continuing the contract. Courts "refuse to enforce contract clauses
that appear designed to deter a breach or to punish the breaching
party rather than compensate the injured party
damage
occasioned by the breach." 1\1elaleuca, Inc. v. Foeller, 155 Idaho
920,927,318 P.3d 910,917 (2014)(quotingA1agic Valley Truck
Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 117, 982
945,
(Ct.App.1999)). When forfeiture is "simply a penalty invoked as a
result
conduct of one of the
forfeiture will not
318 P.3d at 917
allowed." Foeller, 155 Idaho at
(quotingFlemingv.
Idaho 157,161,686 P.2d 837,
841
(Ct.App.1984)).
if
Giesler breaches
the
contract, Giesler loses his development costs and the property
be listed for sale. This seems designed
to persuade
to
complete the contract, and therefore
be an unenforceable
penalty clause.
Id. at 779,521.
This Court explained in

that a judge cannot inject forfeiture

agreement between litigants. Id. However, the
permissible, the terms of such a clause carmot
prohibition applies to all contracts, not
Idaho at 927. ("Parties to an
is not
in this appeaL

went on to explain

into an
even

that were

intended to punish a breaching party. Id. This
a court.
event of breach, but this power
same

that

cases
none of

parties,
agreement.

cases dealt

a court injecting a

provision into the

(involving the enforceability of a forfeiture provision contained within an

employment agreement); Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc., 133 Idaho 110 (involving the
enforcement of a damage provision contained within an employment agreement); Hardy v.
McGill, 137 Idaho 280, 47 P.3d 1250 (2002) (involving a forfeiture provision contained within a
contract for deed sale); and Fleming, 107 Idaho 157 (involving a forfeiture provision contained
within a real property lease). These cases, which were cited as authority in Hull, all support
Vicki's position that the Trial Court was required, but failed, to make findings as to whether the
enforcement

the forfeiture clause was an inequitable penalty, and that in order to

that

determination, the Court would need to make findings as to how much each party was damages
by the alleged breach.
Aside from the irrelevant distinction from Hull, Doug submits no other argument or
authority for his position that the Court did not impose a forfeiture in this case. He

to

Vicki's claim that the Court appeared to acknowledge that the decision worked a forfeiture. In
fact, Vicki had invested more than $236,000.00 into the subject property since the entry of the
Mediated Settlement Agreement,

Court's

caused

to

investment. Without making findings as to how the alleged breach damaged Doug, and whether
those damages were relatively commensurate with the amount to which
the forfeiture, the

finding

was gaining from

the clause was enforceable is reversible error.

a

Next,

even

Judgment, it was not inequitable for the

was a forfeiture prov1s1on m the Stipulated
support of this argument, Doug

cites to Hull for the maxim that "although the law does not favor forfeitures, courts will
uphold contracts

expressly provide for forfeitures." Hull at 521, 779.

as

discussed above, Hull explicitly states that forfeiture provisions intended to function as a penalty
against the breaching party will not be upheld. Id. at 522, 780. Doug completely ignores this
rule, and his attempt to gloss over the body of law developed by Graves 1 and its "'"'"-,-"''"'" 1s
unavailing.

He instead argues

the only exceptions to the enforcement of a forfeiture

provision are procedural irregularities such as the

to provide adequate

to declare forfeiture and that the party declaring forfeiture must not also be

of an
breach

the

agreement This argument simply ignores Hull and Graves, and should be similarly

Doug then attempts to distinguish this case from other forfeiture cases arising from
contract for deed transactions. He puts forward a

of facts but fails to cite to the record

support of those facts. For example, he claims Vicki made no attempt to perform her obligations
under the Stipulated Judgment from May 2014 until the following year. The record clearly
shows this assertion to be false. In addition to obtaining an updated Phase I survey, cleaning up
the contamination on Lot 1, Vicki made a payment on the Lapham debt to Doug's attorney in the

1 Doug's citation to Graves states that it was overruled by Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank. The Benz case only overruled
Graves in part, specifically with respect to a party's ability to collect pre-judgment interest and other sums under a
vendee 's lien. See Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 229, 268 P.3d 1167, 1181 (2012).
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4.

restore

to
l to a

condition

inside of the buildings on Lot 1,
Vol. III,

1, and bring in gravel.

15,

equipment

to grade,

and fill Lot

319-323).

In addition to his failure to submit any factual basis for the alleged distinction between
case and other contract for deed transactions, Doug submits no legal

demonstrating

the significance of this distinction, if indeed there is one. This Court does "not consider an issue
not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, l
524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 454 (2008); see also Idaho App.
contain the contentions of the appellant
reasons therefor,
relied upon.

Idaho

35(a)(6) ("The argument shall

respect to the issues

citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the

the record

Because Doug has failed to support

should not be considered by the Court.
Finally, Doug uses this section of

Reply Brief as an opportunity to argue the

of facts that were admitted at trial solely for background

nnrnr.c

As argued at

trial and in Vicki's opening brief, it was error for the Trial Court to rely on any testimony in its
decisions regarding events or agreements between the parties occurring prior to the execution of
the Stipulated Judgment. Nor should

reasons set forth

in Vicki's opening brief and in Paragraph I, below.

E.

Doug's Assertion that the Rules of Equity Cannot be Applied Where a Party is in
Default Contradicts, and would Overrule, Binding Idaho Precedent.
argues
was

as a matter of

is not entitled to
even as

relief

terms
Judgment before being allowed to

submit any case law stating

must show that she attempted to comply, or
ruling.

equitable measures prior to

Consequently, and in accordance with Jorgensen, this argument should not be

considered by the Court.
If the Court does consider this argument, Doug nevertheless fails provide any logical
argument as to why Graves should not apply to a

in breach. To the contrary, Graves

appears to exist for the purpose of preventing the imposition of unfair damage awards against a
breach, in addition to

on

it appears that

from making such provisions part

nearly of the cases which consider

a

or liquidated damages provision in a contract is enforceable in equity, a
been alleged.

If there had not

a breach, there would be no

provision, and no reason for the Court to consider whether the forfeiture
unenforceable penalty.

Doug's argument in

regard

was an

ignores

established

principles of law in [daho.
Just as Doug fails to set forth any legal

for the argument that Vicki is not entitled to

to submit any
never disputed that
it came due,
a

as

was unable to
did

that shortly

at the
it became due

was

refused to allow

to

amount

31,

14

Lapham debt, including Vicki's remaining portion. (Plaintiff's

5-7).

record shows Doug took out the new loan without any notice to Vicki. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 239 L 41

313,

4-6).

Thus, Vicki was not allowed an opportunity to cure the default upon which

Doug declared a forfeiture of Vicki's interest in Lot 2. By paying off Vicki's half of the Lapham
debt with no notice or opportunity to cure, Doug made Vicki's performance of that obligation
impossible after December 3 I, 2014 when the loan closed. Doug should not be permitted to
argue that Vicki's failure to cure the default or tender payment in the period between January I,
2015 and the evidentiary hearing tends to show that she acted
31, 2014

Doug unilaterally

the

terminating

remaining obligations.
Doug also argues that Vicki never sought specific performance as a means of
the Judgment.

Doug fails to submit authority demonstrating a requirement that a party seek

specific performance as a condition precedent to the application of the defense
inequitable forfeitures, or submit any logical reason why the same should be

In

accordance with Jorgensen, the Court should not consider this issue.

F.

Doug's Assertion that Vicki is not Entitled to Relief on the Grounds of Unclean
Hands is not Supported by the Findings of the Court or the Record.
In section 4 of Doug's brief, he argues that Vicki had unclean hands, and

appropriate

the Trial

to

equitable relief. However, the
to be in

it

not

or

Doug fails to
inequitably,

to

record or

authority demonstrating that Vicki acted

, dishonestly, fraudulently, or deceitfully.

irrelevant testimony regarding claims and

Here

Doug relies on

occurred prior to

parties reaching

mediation a Mediated Settlement Agreement which was subsequently converted to a
Stipulated Judgment. As set forth

Section I below, these claims

Vicki's opening brief and

and defenses should not have been considered by the Trial Court and should not be considered
this Court.

Therefore, the only relevant facts submitted by Doug as evidence

unclean hands are

Vicki's

failure to pay the remainder of

to fully vacate Lot 1.

no support for

ore,1cn of contract

unclean hands. Thus, Doug has failed to support the

or authority
from seeking equitable

relief. Consonant with Jorgensen, the Court should not consider
Doug also argues in this section

an adequate remedy at law,

his Brief that

and her failure to pursue that remedy prohibits her

seeking equitable relief. Specifically, he

argues that Vicki's remedy was to comply with the terms of
is

The opportunity to

not an 'adequate remedy at law.' An adequate
damages

a wrongdoer.2 When damages would

issue.

Stipulated Judgment This

terms
is the right to sue for and collect
an inadequate or

to ascertain, a

does not

an

"""''.,-"',.., an equitable defense to Doug's motion to forfeit. Doug fails to provide authority for
the argument that a party may not assert an equitable defense when they

failed to

an

adequate remedy at law. Pursuant to Jorgensen, supra, the Court should not consider this issue.

G.

The Trial Court Failed to Make the Necessary Findings of Fact to Support any
Finding as to Whether the Forfeiture Provision in the Stipulated Judgment was an
Inequitable Penalty.
Next, Doug argues that the Trial Court employed the correct legal analysis in its decision

to impose the forfeiture.

He claims that

Trial Court did not refuse to consider Vicki's

That claim is in contrast to the language of the memorandum decisions. In

first

and must be enforced by the court, that the substantial compliance 1s not a
sufficient defense to Doug's motion to

title, and "[hJaving reached this conclusion, the

Court shall not address any of [Vicki's] other equitable arguments." (R. Vol. III, p. 474)
(emphasis added). After Vicki moved the Trial Court to reconsider that conclusion, the second
memorandum decision stated "the cases on land sale contracts cited by [Vicki] are not applicable
to the instance (sic) case because there is no underlying contract here." (R. Vol. III, p. 570).

Graves and

progeny were developed

within the context

land

contracts and

is available

3

See e.g., ~'-'-==-=-'-==--'..:..=o~"-'==-"===,
available

Cir. l

relief is

when

not

UIJIJH,cUU

because it is unclear

Court applied

or refused to apply the Graves analysis following the
look to the second memorandum decision

can
findings

the
Reconsideration, we

to see whether the Trial Court

necessary findings that would be required under Graves. Doug argues that the

Court's analysis was appropriate and all equitable factors were properly considered. However,
examination of the decision, it appears
damages occasioned to Doug, many of
Judgment. The Trial Court made note

the vast

of the findings only referenced

occurring prior to the entry of the
by Vicki, of $80,000. (R. Vol. III.

only one

ev1ae11ce from trial
that. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 320,

1

Defendant's

by Vicki and the total amount

a finding as to the total amounts to be
(Vol III, p 502-503).

Without those findings, we cannot determine
related to

damages suffered by Doug.

concemmg
the absence of

Trial Court

not

specifically asked the Trial Court to

make findings or discuss these payments at

occasioned to Doug.

more than

The

Court failed to

damages

such

the sums forfeited by Vicki were reasonably
Here, the Magistrate made no specific finding

at
amount

by

to consider whether

forfeiture

Judgment was

to

Doug.
Additionally, the Trial Court completely
provision was exorbitant or arbitrary.

The Trial Court found that the provision was not

unconscionable, but gave no explanation for that conclusion. Without these findings, there is no
for the Trial Court to determine whether the provision was intended as a penalty and thereby
These are required findings under Graves, and it was error to refuse to
such findings.
Trial Court's

fact, the Trial Court never considered whether the
or refusal to make

legal analysis under Graves also

was a penalty.

necessary findings and apply the appropriate
an abuse of

Doug fails to submit

or provide argument explaining how the

was consistent with

Graves. He does not argue that the provision was not a penalty, unconscionable, or exorbitant.
Therefore, Doug's assertion that the Trial Court's analysis was correct should not be considered.
Doug provides no authority for the argument that

forfeiture language is permissible

simply because Vicki was represented by counsel at the time

entered into the Stipulated

as mandated

not consider this

not dispose of
as

as suggested by

delineated

prov1s1on. Doug fails to res1Don,ct to
merely rests upon the Trial Court's

u u ~ . . ,F,0

and conclusions.

but

mandated

the Court should not consider this claim.

H.

The Issues of Waiver and Judicial Estoppel were Properly Raised.
Doug's assertion that Vicki is raising the issue of waiver for

first

untrue. Vicki raised this issue in her post-trial brief, and specifically asked
ruling on this issue, and Doug
Vol. II, p. 377-380; 406-410).
adverse ruling
cannot

Trial Court for a

argument in his

(R

properly raise an issue on appeal

court below or the
for the first

Idaho 118, 12

to

on appeal is

an

must have been raised

on appeal."

44 P.3d I 173, 1176-77 (2002). Because this

was raised in

court

below, it has been preserved for appeal.
Doug argues that he did not waive

to declare

can

established by proof of an affirmative act demonstrating an intention to

one's right or

advantage. He argues that his conduct, in routinely accepting Vicki's late oai,rm,ents.
amount to
definition of

support
According to

this

Doug

to

case, "[w]aiver is a voluntary,

a

not
a

relinquishment

a question

1S

Waiver wm not be inferred except from a clear

act

an

to

or

to

action that Doug's course
right to declare a

conduct in accepting Vicki's
vUJ,vUL>-U

on a late payment
course of conduct

Doug fails to explain how

repeatedly accepting Vicki's late

he attempts to show that Vicki failed to explain

payments did not result in a waiver.
her 'conclusion' that the payments reflected
is disingenuous, particularly because

Defendant's Exhibit C were late. This argument
himself argued, in his Post-Trial Reply Brief, in

opposition to Vicki's argument that Doug had waived
Stipulated Judgment, that "[w ]hile it is true

compliance with the terms

[Vicki] was late in [her] payments,

consistently been
Mediated Settlement Agreement," that "[t]here were

that were made late by [Vicki],

but all payments were relayed to escrow as soon as

and

record to the contrary," and that "Vicki was
(R.

consideration from one party through means

the

of judicial estoppeL

a litigant who obtains a judgment, advantage, or
sworn statements is judicially estopped from
a

against another party, arising out

no

making payments from October to March."

II, p. 407). These conflicting positions implicate the

Judicial estoppel is the concept

1s

the same transaction or

or a

matter." Heinze v. Bauer,

Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600
P.2d

I,

(1954)). It

one

by
action.

~~~'

a

145 Idaho at

178 P.3d at 600.

a party from taking opposing positions to gain an

litigation.

Although it would be difficult to demonstrate that Doug gained any specific advantage
outcome of

trial as a direct result of his argument that

payments were

should not be permitted to argue now that Vicki's payments were not late to
this appeal. Thus,

Court should not consider Doug's argument that Vicki's failed to

that her payments were late and that Doug accepted
Defendant's

C clearly shows late fees were ass:es:,eu on

~a.,u~ ..

Doug's

was subsequently
July

ex1genc1es

payments.
made to

to the escrow

2014.

Doug would have this Court ignore that intent may be
because, in actuality, his conduct amounted to
"'<.HUvL,c,

or authority demonstrating that he did not

with the terms of the Stipulated Judgment. Although he points to his
declare a forfeiture by filing a Motion to Quiet Title,
to

was
demonstrate that
his
of

vacate

1

acknowledges that the basis for that
March 31,

was going to require strict compliance
v=1-=va,~

to

in April, 2014 to

to
deadlines is not

April, 2014

evidence

forward by

not intend to

how these

not

on

demanded strict compliance with her obligation to make timely payments, nor is there language
within the

describing the result that would occur if Vicki failed to pay off her share

the Lapham

by October 15, 20

To the contrary, Plaintiffs Exhibit

actually

contemplates a one year extension of the payoff date to October 15, 2015. It is unclear how
these Exhibits may be construed to give Vicki reasonable notice that Doug intended to declare a
how they provide Vicki with a reasonable opportunity to cure the

forfeiture, much

evidence to show that he

delinquent payments. Doug submits no
intent to declare a

or that he provided her with a reasonable opportunity before doing

so. For this reason, he should be held to

waiver.

Aside from arguing that Vicki
that Vicki

Vicki notice of his

to submit a legal basis for

to raise this issue prior to the appeal, Doug asserts
claim that Doug waived his right to declare a

forfeiture. Again, this argument is without merit Vicki clearly cited Sullivan v. Burcaw and
King v. Seebeck, cases which establish

right to declare a forfeiture may be waived by

engaging in a course of conduct that is inconsistent with strict performance, and that such waiver
may only be cured by reasonable notice and opportunity to cure. It is unclear
does not

a legal

Doug even included

Doug believes
same

citation to King that Vicki provided. 4 Although he acknowledges that Vicki had a pattern of
non-compliance, he

4

that he was not

[t

word 'Respondent' were
and minimize references to
with LA.R.

to put Vicki on

that he would require

notice
delinquent payments.

so,

to

to make the

Sullivan v. Burcaw, 35 Idaho 755, 763, 208 P. 841,

(1922).

to this case, and he fails to submit evidence that

does not argue that Sullivan is

Vicki any notice of his intention to forfeiture her rights under the Stipulated Judgment or
that he gave her a reasonable opportunity to do so. Rather, he argues that she should have
would forfeit her rights for the

to make
this Court should find that Doug was unable to

this argument with any factual basis.
a forfeiture because he had

I.

requirement

Vicki make

The Trial Court Erred by Considering Evidence of Events which Occurred Prior to
the Stipulated Judgment.

Court

It is Vicki's position herein that the

not consider the

as that settlement resolved all

up to that point

for his argument that the court

Doug disagrees, but fails to put forward

Lapham debt, unpaid taxes,

considered testimony regarding the

that were at issue prior to mediation. Ironically, Doug argues that it is Vicki that failed to
argument or authority in this

IS

First, Vicki argued at
Stipulated Judgment

(R.

under the statute of frauds.
p.

I, p. 95).

for
for background purposes so

came to

understand how the

Stipulated Judgment. Doug fails to
accordance with Jorgensen, supra, the Court

to

m

not consider Doug's argument

that

at

this testimony was not relevant to the

Had the Trial Court ruled that the testimony was admissible for all purposes, Vicki would
taken that opportunity to submit evidence

own regarding her

the

lease agreement.
J.

The Forfeiture Provision in the Stipulated Judgment is Arbitrary.

Doug next

was not

that
or authority to support

submit
was

or circumstances
is enforceable for any breach of the

Stipulated Judgment, no matter how slight, it is an ~"'""·~,
and its progeny. Graves states that "if a forfeiture is simply a

or

parties, the forfeiture will not
that a

disallowed by
as a result

forward no authority

accordance with Doe.
damages,

to
was compensating Doug
was

the

VV<c'U'-"'VS

party is in material breach. Thus, Doug's argument

it cannot

to

out

because it

surrounding Doug's actual damages. Because

conduct of one of

Doug

0u0uu,,... u

by Vicki's

was not
enforcing the

was arbitrary.
the Trial
damages.

Doug's Interference with Vicki's
to Refinance the Lapham Debt, and
Therein Satisfy her Duties Under the Stipulated Judgment, Precluded Doug from
Enforcing that Agreement, and the Trial Court's Findings to the Contrary are not
Supported by the Record.

K.

It is undisputed that Doug

declared a forfeiture of

of Vicki's rights and

interests under the Stipulated Judgment
does not

a violation of the

Echoing the Trial Court, he
he was

imminent foreclosure

and fair
was forced to
Joe Lapham.

however, no evidence

foreclosure was imminent Doug
Lapham's attorney, Rex Finney.

claims that page l

l

of

transcript

demonstrate that Mr. Finney was prepared to proceed with the foreclosure deadline

1

and Mr. Finney communicated as much to counsel for Doug. That

page 174, lines 1-8 of the trial transcript.

it

note that was owed to

on

not demonstrate that Mr.
In

immediately thereafter, Mr. Finney

while still under

examination by Doug's attorney, that a foreclosure was not«""""~'
Featherston) Q: Okay. And it was about
the deadline.

the

(Mr. Finney) A: Yeah. We were discussing an
and my client had not started foreclosure.

~,.,,~u0n.,u

of

Q: Okay. On November I It\ 201 you
me (counsel for
Doug) a voice mail, did you not, that stated
wanted to
what the status was and did you not also ask '""' .,,-.c,,. or not I could
accept service on a foreclosure?
1

A: Well, I called you, left a message that I wanted to talk to you
about extending, or if we're not gonna agree to
gonna represent your client in the foreclosure.

Q: Okay.
A: But there was nothing to actually accept

at that

Q: Okay.
A: No Notice of Default, although the note was due.

Q: Did you and I ever talk about the foreclosure,

A: Just to the extent that if it went to foreclosure
see what your
as
or not.
Vol. III, p. 175, L 1

you can

and

an

1

a foreclosure was

to pay

is no evidence that

loan was so urgent that he

time to

not

his intention to

Vicki

obligation

refinance the loan or give her a reasonable opportunity to pay off
before Doug took out a second loan on the property to pay off the Lapham

Doug misconstrues Vicki's argument with respect to the duty to cooperate. He claims
to

that Doug should not have transferred the

2 to Vicki because she had not paid off her

half of the Lapham debt Vicki's

been consistent

Doug had transferred Lot 2 to Vicki, even at the

a refinance,

Because

would have

had a

at
require that it

have allowed Lot 2 to be pledged as collateral
transferred to Vicki
no

the

that process.

from

reason for Doug to prevent this

comply

with the demands listed in his August

letter (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). However, the

shows, and the Trial Court found, that

Stipulated

u"'"'-'-'H·'"

did not require
to

found in that

was the failure to pay off

Lot 2, the only material breach
her debt and the
had to

vacate Lot I .
r,ar+."'"'""

to

on

III,

If Doug's

and constructing a new
Doug calls his testimony about insisting that Vicki build a new road before
title a red herring. It is not a red herring. The requirement to build a new road was not
the Stipulated Judgment. Doug testified that when Vicki would ask for the deed, he

of
ask

when she was going to build the road. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 392, L. 12-22). At the hearing on Doug's
interference with Vicki's ability to comply with the judgment, Doug's attorney argued that Vicki
was required to build a road (Tr. Vol. II, p. 9, L. 23-25; p. 10-14). Rex Finney testified that
had heard Vicki had to build a road before title would be transferred. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 179, L
23). Doug's
construction of the

2ih letter gives Vicki a deadline for and imposes conditions on the
(Plaintiff's

4). It is clear, therefore, that

was determined

to have Vicki build an alternate access to Lot 2 before he would consider
despite the fact that transferring title would allow her to pay off the remainder
Lapham debt and construct

alternate access. Additionally, one

title to her,
her share of the

the reasons Vicki did not

build the road was because she did not have title to Lot
Finally, Doug has repeated at every stage of this lawsuit that there is no evidence that Joe
Lapham would

made a loan to Vicki. This assertion is simply untrue and was refuted by

m
Lapham, Vicki Visser, Rex Finney, and Margaret Williams, stating that Joe Lapham would have
loaned Vicki the
128-1

p. l
4

had Doug agreed to let Vicki use Lot 2 as collateral. (Tr.
· p. 254,

1-25,

1-23; p. 308, L.17-25;

III, p.

L. 1-20; p.392,

asserts

to

fees with argument and

contrary,

was entitled to fees on appeal, and, as authority
to the Stipulated Judgment, which provides

this

an award of attorneys fees to the prevailing party

to enforce the terms of thereof Obviously, this

in any

argued

an action to enforce

terms

the Stipulated Judgment, should Vicki prevail herein, she should be awarded reasonable
fees. Doug appears to argue that it was necessary that Vicki cite to Appellate Rule 41.
cases cited by Doug

support of this argument state

Rule 41 is not a basis for

Although he acknowledges a rule from ==~-'---"'-~-==-=~"'-'-'-~~, 149 Idaho
240

are awardable only where they are

583, 590 (2010)

statute or contract," Doug claims that Vicki was required to do more. She was not
do anything more than tell the
Judgment) and her basis therefore

V.
For

to attorneys

1S

she prevails,

to

contract

her to costs and fees).

CONCLUSION

foregoing reasons, Vicki respectfully request that the Court reject the claims and

defenses put forward by Doug and reverse

decision

Court.
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